Author: Ahmed Velmi
I. Introduction: The core of the issue is Creed (Aqidah), not Jurisprudence (Fiqh)
The establishment of core doctrines, or Aqidah, necessitated addressing the legitimate role of political opposition. Aqidah refers to the fundamental, non-negotiable beliefs of the Muslim community, and when a political stance, such as obedience or resistance, is embedded within the creed, it elevates the matter from merely Fiqh (jurisprudence) to a fundamental requirement for sound belief. The theological containment or “removal” of political activism from mainstream creeds represents a strategic choice made by religious authorities under pressure from historical circumstance and political reality.
I.A. Defining the Terms of Engagement
The foundational mandate for political accountability in Islam is the concept of Al-Amr bi Al-Maruf wa Al-Nahy an Al-Munkar (Ordering the Right and Forbidding the Wrong). This Quranic imperative is a collective duty intended to encourage righteous behaviour, discourage immorality, and establish justice by removing oppression from society. This duty is universally applied across moral, social, political, and economic facets of life. In the earliest period of the community, this mandate was inherently political, demanding accountability from the ruler. As demonstrated by the statement attributed to the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, “Obey me so long as I obey God and His Messenger. But if I disobey God and His Messenger, you owe me no obedience”. The subsequent theological project of quietism, therefore, centered on constraining the militant or public application of this duty specifically toward the ruling authorities.
I.B. Defining the Constraint: Khurooj (Rebellion)
The constraint placed upon political activism is codified primarily through the prohibition of Khurooj (literally, ‘going out’). Khurooj is defined comprehensively by jurists as the act of attempting to seize authority from the ruler, opposing him publicly, inciting the populace against him through writings or protests, or challenging him with the sword. The removal of activism refers to the doctrinal shift that re-categorized this action not merely as a failed political manoeuvre but as a religious transgression (Bidah or Haram) that threatens the unity of the Muslim community (Jamaah). This theological management of political dissent proceeded along two distinct tracks: one pragmatic, centered on stability (Sunni), and the other eschatological, cantered on infallibility (Twelver Shia).
II. Mainstream Theological Foundations
To understand the constraints on activism, it is necessary to identify the dominant theological schools (Aqidah) that solidified these principles.
II.A. Mainstream Sunni Aqidah Schools
Mainstream Sunni Islam, often referred to as Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaah (The People of the Sunnah and the Community), rests upon three primary schools of theology that emerged during the Abbasid era.
- Athariah: This school is characterized by its adherence to scriptural texts (Quran and Sunnah) and generally advocates for literal affirmation of divine attributes without engaging in rational interpretation (Tawil) or speculative theology (Kalam). This traditionalist approach strongly emphasizes obedience to the transmitted texts concerning political authority.
- Ashariyyah: Named after Abu Al-Hasan Al-Ashari (d. 936 CE), this school utilizes rational discourse (Kalam) to defend orthodox principles, establishing a middle ground between rationalism and traditionalism.
- Maturidiyyah: Named after Abu Mansur Al-Maturidi (d. 944 CE), this school, prevalent among Hanafi jurists, is closely related to Asharism but exhibits slightly different positions, particularly concerning free will and human reason.
These three theological schools exist alongside the four dominant schools of jurisprudence (Fiqh): the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali madhhabs. The widespread acceptance of political quietism became an article of faith unifying these diverse theological and legal traditions.
II.B. Mainstream Twelver Shia Aqidah
Twelver Shiaism (Ithna Ashariyya) is the largest branch of Shia Islam, comprising approximately 85% of all Shias. Their credal system is fundamentally rooted in the doctrine of the Imamate, which posits that the succession to the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) must remain within his family through specific individuals designated by divine appointment (nass).
Twelver theology holds that the Twelve Imams are divinely appointed as both spiritual and political successors and possess special knowledge and infallibility (Ismah). Their jurisprudence is referred to as the Jafari school, named after the sixth Imam, Jafar AlSadiq. The constraint on activism in Twelver Shiaism is intrinsically tied to the status of the Imam and the doctrine of his Occultation (Ghayba).
III. The Removal of Activism in Mainstream Sunni Aqidah
The process by which political quietism became an article of Sunni faith involved a historical compromise, where the ideal of justice was subordinated to the pragmatic necessity of state stability.
III.A. The Historical Impetus: Fitnah and the Abbasid Consolidation
The first two centuries of Islam were characterized by intense political strife and civil wars (Fitnah), which often centered on the legitimacy of the Caliph. This period of turmoil led influential jurists to prioritize the cohesion of the community (Jamaah) above the immediate removal of unjust rulers. The resulting political theology was an exercise in post eventum justification: scholars rationalized the existence of the established dynasties (Umayyads and Abbasids), which had become hereditary and autocratic, by ratifying historical precedents through scholarly consensus (Ijma).
The analysis of this period suggests that the supreme political value shifted from securing justice to ensuring security. The consequence of this prioritizing of stability was the elevation of non-rebellion to a theological necessity. Because armed resistance, even against a corrupt government, inevitably led to widespread chaos and bloodshed, it was deemed impermissible (Haram). This pragmatic choice became a theological imperative, transforming Khurooj from a political act into a source of religious corruption (Fitnah).
III.B. The Doctrinal Mechanism: Neutralizing the Khawarij and the Role of the Murjiah
The most direct threat to early Islamic unity came from the Khawarij (Muhakkima), who employed the mechanism of Takfir, declaring a sinful Muslim ruler to be outside the creed of Islam (Kafir), to justify their violent rebellion (Khurooj). To prevent such movements from perpetually destabilizing the state, mainstream orthodoxy needed a theological countermeasure.
The necessary doctrinal foundation was supplied, in part, by the extinct school of the Murjiah. The Murjiah advocated Irja (postponement of judgment) concerning the religious status of a sinner. By arguing that deeds do not negate faith, the Murjiah movement neutralized the primary theological justification for Khurooj. Historically, the Murjiah trend was prominent in Iraq and played a role in stabilizing the status of the Umayyads. Mainstream Sunni theology, while rejecting the radical excesses of Murjiite thought, adopted its political conclusion: that a Muslim ruler, regardless of whether he is oppressive or immoral, retains his legitimacy as long as he maintains the outward practice of Islam. This decoupling of a ruler’s oppressive deeds from his religious status was the crucial step that mandated obedience even to an “evil-doing and barbarous sultan”.
III.C. Canonical Codification of Obedience
The prohibition of political activism was codified explicitly within core Sunni creedal texts.The theological basis for quietism derives from several authentic prophetic narrations (Hadith). These narrations prohibit rebellion, stating that anyone who rebels against the ruler “by as much as a handspan and dies but that he will have died a death of ignorance (Jahiliyyah)” (Sahih Muslim 1849). Other narrations instruct patience and obedience, “even if the one appointed over you is an Ethiopian slave”.
Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855 CE), the foundational figure of the Athariah tradition, explicitly incorporated this quietism into his creedal works. In his Usoolus-Sunnah (Foundations of the Sunnah), points 53-54, he asserted that revolt against the ruler is unlawful, stating that whoever does so “is an innovator, (and is) upon other than the Sunnah and the [correct] path”.
The definitive textual evidence for the wider Ashari and Maturidi consensus is found in (10th century CE) Imam Al-Tahawi’s Al-Aqidah Al-Tahawiyah, Lesson 39 : Points [157158]. This foundational creedal text explicitly states: “And we do not hold rebelling against our rulers and those in authority over our affairs. Even if they oppress”. By the 13th century, scholars confirmed that the prohibition of Khurooj was a matter of scholarly consensus (Ijma). Imam Al-Nawawi, commenting on Sahih Muslim, asserted that revolt is unlawful (Haram) according to the consensus of religious scholars, even if the ruler is corrupt or oppressive, because the revealed texts mandate patience and obedience. This consensus solidified the constraint of activism within the Aqidah of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaah.
IV. The Removal of Activism in Mainstream Twelver Shia Aqidah
In Twelver Shiaism, the constraint on activism was not primarily rooted in political pragmatism, but in the theological necessity of the infallible Imamate.
IV.A. Early Strategic Withdrawal and Taqiyyah
The sixth Imam, Jafar Al-Sadiq (d. 765 CE), lived during the chaotic shift from the Umayyad to the Abbasid caliphates. Recognizing the futility and danger of immediate political confrontation, Al-Sadiq maintained a politically quietist stance. While he viewed himself as the divinely designated leader of the community, he did not advance political claims to the caliphate.
This strategic withdrawal served to secure the survival of the nascent Shia community, allowing Al-Sadiq to freely propagate and elaborate on Twelver theological teachings, including the doctrine of the Imamate, which emphasized spiritual authority over political dominion. Crucially, Al-Sadiq institutionalized the doctrine of Taqiyyah (religious dissimulation), allowing adherents to conceal their beliefs when facing persecution. Taqiyyah became a political necessity, enabling self-preservation under Sunni rulers and functionally embedding a form of political quietism for the minority population.
Significantly, while the early Imams avoided armed rebellion, they maintained a theological distance from the state. Al-Sadiq warned jurisprudents against cooperating with kings and their offices, stating that if scholars are seen “riding alongside the kings, then accuse them”. This differentiated the Shia quietist mechanism from the Sunni mechanism: the Shia did not compel obedience to the unjust ruler; rather, they mandated withdrawal and spiritual opposition to the source of illegitimate power.
IV.B. The Definitive Constraint: The Major Occultation (Ghaybah Kubra)
The structural removal of organized political activism from the Twelver creed was finalized by the doctrine of the Major Occultation (Al-Ghaybah Al-Kubra), which began in 941 CE. Twelvers believe the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, was concealed by Allah and will not reappear until the End of Time to reestablish justice.
The theological argument for this constraint rests on the premise that the Earth cannot be void of the Hujjah (Highest Proof of Allah). However, because the Imams are infallible, the establishment of a truly just, divinely guided Islamic state requires the presence of this infallible authority.
The doctrine of Ghaybah created a state of political postponement. Since only the Mahdi can achieve the ideal Islamic state and apply Sharia fully, any attempt by fallible human beings, regardless of their piety or skill, to establish a full government before the Mahdi’s return is inherently flawed and illegitimate. The Twelver creed thus mandated political waiting, structurally constraining activist efforts aimed at state-building until the eschatological moment of the Mahdi’s reappearance.
IV.C. Classical Authority During Ghaybah
In the absence of the infallible Imam, the leadership vacuum was gradually managed by the religious jurists (Fuqaha). However, their authority (Wilayat Al-Faqih) was strictly limited in classical doctrine. Traditionally, the jurists’ role was confined to acting as deputies for the Imam in judicial matters (Wilayat al-Qada, administering justice) and social welfare matters (Wilayat Al-Qaraba, guardianship over those incapable, such as orphans or the mentally ill).
While some classical Twelver scholars maintained that cooperation with unjust rulers was permissible under specific conditions (e.g., if sanctioned by the absent Imam for the community’s benefit), this was always done from a position of limited authority, ensuring that the Fuqaha themselves did not assume the absolute sovereignty reserved for the Imam. This tradition of classical quietism defined Twelver political theology for nearly a millennium.
V. Activation and Conflict: The Modern Reversal of Quietism
While Sunni quietism has maintained doctrinal stability, continuing to prohibit Khurooj as the means to maintain internal security, Twelver quietism underwent a radical
theological fracture in the 20th century, leading to a profound reinsertion of activism into the creed of a major segment of the community.
V.A. The Shia Revolution and Wilayat al-Mutlaqa al-Faqīh
The constraints imposed by the Major Occultation were directly challenged by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989), the leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Khomeini explicitly redefined the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) from its traditional limited scope into Absolute Guardianship (Wilayat Al-Mutlaqa Al-Faqih).
Khomeini argued that since the Prophet and the Imams possessed “divine authority over the people”, and since the implementation of Islamic law (Sharia) is obligatory, the most qualified jurist must assume that same absolute governmental authority during the Imam’s absence, to prevent the stagnation of Islamic law and societal decay. This theoretical shift was a significant theological departure from classical Shiaite doctrine.
This constituted the official re-insertion of activism into the ruling Twelver creed in Iran. The new doctrine made the establishment of an Islamic state led by a cleric a mandatory obligation, replacing the classical credal requirement of withdrawal and eschatological waiting with political engagement and the assumption of sovereignty. This revolutionary concept was enshrined in the Iranian Constitution.
V.B. The Najaf Counterpoint: Maintaining Traditional Quietism
Khomeini’s revolutionary theory was met with significant theological resistance from the traditional clerical centers, most notably the Hawza (seminary) of Najaf in Iraq. Senior figures, including Grand Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Al-Khoei and his successor, Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani (d. present), maintained the classical quietist position.
The rationale for the Najaf quietist position remains rooted in the doctrine of the Occultation: mortal human beings are inherently prone to error and corruption, and therefore, no mortal can establish a truly just Islamic rule on Earth. Full justice must await the Mahdi. Consequently, traditional Twelver authorities oppose the Iranian concept of Absolute Guardianship (Wilayat Al-Mutlaqa), often describing it as blasphemous.
However, modern Najaf quietism is not pure political abstinence but rather a model of “restrained interventionism”. While figures like Sistani refuse to take formal political office or establish a theocracy, they intervene decisively on moral and national issues to preserve the integrity of the state and the community. For example, Sistani influenced the Iraqi political process by rejecting the US-led authority’s plan for constitutional assembly, insisting instead on a body elected by the people. He also issues fatwas urging electoral participation and mobilizing citizens during crises, such as against ISIS.
This approach allows the clergy to exercise moral and social authority without assuming the fallible, potentially corruptible reins of government.
VI. Conclusion: Comparative Analysis and Nuanced Implications
The analysis confirms that political activism, specifically in the form of armed rebellion or public defiance against the established ruler (Khurooj), was systematically constrained and doctrinally removed from the mainstream Aqidah of both Sunni and Twelver Shia Islam during the medieval period. However, the mechanism, rationale, and subsequent stability of this constraint differ profoundly.
The constraint on Sunni activism was primarily pragmatic and political, driven by the catastrophic historical experience of the Fitnah and the necessity of state consolidation under the Abbasid Caliphate. The process involved neutralizing the challenge of Takfir through Murjiite influence, culminating in the command to obey the fallible ruler, regardless of his oppression. Activism was thus officially prohibited and designated a heresy (Bidah) to ensure order and continuity of the Jamaah.
In contrast, the constraint on Twelver Shia activism was theological and eschatological, driven by the doctrine of the Imamate and the Major Occultation. Because ultimate authority and infallible justice were reserved exclusively for the absent Imam al-Mahdi, the creed mandated abstention from establishing a full state.28 Activism, in the sense of state-building, was postponed until the return of the Imam Al-Mehdi, thereby preserving the ideal of justice by rejecting the legitimacy of any temporary, fallible government.
This fundamental difference explains the contrasting responses to political modernity. While Sunni quietism (the prohibition of Khurooj) has remained doctrinally stable, Twelver quietism was violently fractured by Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary reinterpretation of Wilayat Al-Faqih in the 20th century.
Khomeini’s theory required a major theological break to reinject activism and the obligation of state formation back into the creed. Meanwhile, traditionalist centers like Najaf maintain the classical quietist principle, arguing that true justice requires infallible guidance and that their role is restricted to moral and judicial intervention, maintaining independence from the inevitably flawed temporal state. Thus, in both major branches of Islam, the theological management of political action remains the central tension between the ideal mandate for justice (Amr bi Al-Maruf) and the practical requirements of political survival and stability.